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EU member states must share the burden of the fiscal costs of the COVID-19 
pandemic. The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument delivers such burden 
sharing: The EU would borrow 440 billion euros in the market and 
would give it as grants to member states for specific spending in areas 
such as health care, short-time works schemes or stimulus packages; it 
would also give guarantees to the European Investment Bank to pro-
vide liquidity to European companies.
This text was first published as a VoxEU column on VoxEU.org on 5 April 2020.
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Executive summary
The debate over how Europe should cope with the fiscal costs of the COVID-19 pan-
demic is in full swing. Adversaries and opponents of “Coronabonds” seem suddenly 
back in the trenches of the euro crisis. Our proposal attempts to build a bridge bet-
ween the two camps: We do not propose a full-on Eurobond or any mutualisation of 
existing debt, as this is not how we should overcome the unique challenges of this 
crisis. Instead, we propose a Pandemic Solidarity Instrument that is tailored speci-
fically to this crisis. The EU does not need another layer of market-access insurance, 
as the European Central Bank and the European Stability Mechanism are already in 
place for this. What it needs is an instrument to share the costs of the crisis.
The main problem the EU faces now is that some member states have entered this 
crisis in a much weaker economic position and with higher debt levels than others. 
At the same time, all countries have a vital interest in all other countries being able 
to spend as much as necessary to fight the economic fallout of the pandemic. To 
ensure that this happens, we need a burden sharing of the fiscal costs of this crisis.
The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument delivers this burden sharing. It should be set 
up as an EU instrument: The EU would borrow 440 billion euros in the market, ba-
cked by the EU budget and by guarantees of the member states. As this would be 
EU debt, it would not count as debt of individual member states. The bonds issued 
by the EU would have long maturities and could be refinanced in the market at the 
end of their terms; otherwise, they would be repaid once they come due according 
to the future state of economic strength of member states.
The funds would be used for four purposes:
•	 Grants to member states to partially cover health-related costs;
•	 Guarantees to the European Investment Bank to provide liquidity to European 
companies;
•	 Subsidies to member states so that they can fund short-time work schemes and 
short-term unemployment benefits;
•	 Co-financing of national stimulus packages once confinement measures have 
been lifted.
The Instrument would be based on Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. This article gives the EU wide discretion to act in emergency 
situations. In our legal analysis, we show how this article allows the EU to bor-
row in this specific context and why our proposal does not conflict with the EU’s 
no-bailout clause.
The document may be reproduced in part or in full on the dual condition that its meaning 
is not distorted and that the source is mentioned • The views expressed are those of the au-
thor(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher • The Hertie School cannot be held 
responsible for the use which any third party may make of the document • Original version
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Introduction
In a public health crisis, the EU has limited authority and few tools at its disposal to 
help fight it. The European Commission can help by co-ordinating member states’ 
policies, via joint procurement of medical equipment or the safe return of Europeans 
overseas, for example. It can use its limited funds for virological and epidemiological 
research and help re-direct EU budget items to support health systems. At times, the 
Commission has had to keep member states from harming the common interest, such 
as excessive use of border controls or export bans. 
Economic policies are also largely in the hands of national governments. It is they who 
decide how to support a struggling economy under lockdown, whether to defer tax-
es, subsidise lending to companies, increase sick pay, institute schemes to keep work-
ers on the payroll and the like. And national governments will have to foot the bill for 
these measures. 
The COVID-19 crisis, however, is bound to be so expensive that some national govern-
ments may be overwhelmed by the subsequent increase in public debt. In that case, 
two equally dangerous scenarios are possible. Either some member states, fearful of a 
high future debt burden, may not spend as much as is needed to preserve their econ-
omies and will end up much worse off than countries that are able to spend more. Or 
these member states do spend as much as needed, but may face increasingly high 
interest rates as markets doubt that public debt is sustainable, at which point the eu-
rozone may face yet another existential crisis. 
To avoid these two scenarios, we propose a Pandemic Solidarity Instrument (PSI) that 
would lead to a partial sharing of the fiscal costs of this crisis through the issuance of 
a one-off EU – not Eurozone – asset in the market. The funds raised through this asset 
would then be used to:
•	 help countries to cover the costs that are directly related to fighting the virus;
•	  ensure firms have enough liquidity to survive the lockdown (via the European 
Investment Bank (EIB));
•	  subsidise firms to keep workers on the payroll (via new European co-financing of 
national short-work schemes); and
•	 kickstart the economy, once it is safe to do so, where the hit was hardest (via 
new European co-financing of national stimulus plans).
Our proposal would not add another layer of market-access insurance for eurozone 
countries.1 There are already two powerful institutions providing those. The first is the 
European Central Bank (ECB), which not only sets monetary policy for most European 
countries, but is also de facto the lender of last resort to eurozone governments – much 
like national central banks everywhere. With its recent Pandemic Emergency Purchase 
Programme (PEPP), the ECB has made sure that all countries will have low funding 
costs during this crisis. The second institution is the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), the Eurozone’s bailout fund, which can provide loans and precautionary credit 
1 For a comprehensive proposal on a safety net for market access see Guttenberg and Hem-
ker, ‘Corona: A European safety net for the fiscal net’, Jacques Delors Centre Policy Brief, 2020. 
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lines to countries that struggle to fund themselves on markets. Non-euro countries 
have access to the EU’s balance-of-payment facility, which provides similar help. Our 
proposal rather fills a gap left by the EU budget: it is currently unequipped in terms of 
both size and structure to provide the kind of burden sharing across the entire Union 
that is needed in this unprecedented crisis.
1 The economic hit, and possible fiscal  
response needed, and impact on debt
It is near impossible to predict the economic fallout from this crisis. Govern-
ments have not shut down societies in living memory, and at the time of writing, 
it was still unclear when countries in Europe will be ready to lift the restrictions 
on people’s movement, workers and the economy, and how strongly the econo-
my will rebound.
But we can draw on first estimates: The OECD and the IMF (and various national 
bodies) have recently published their assessments of the economic impact of 
the current shutdown in Europe. The conclusions are roughly similar. We follow 
the OECD’s assessment, which calculates that economic output under lockdown 
is 25% lower than would otherwise be the case. If we assume a lockdown of 
three months and a linear recovery over the next three months, output would 
be 8.3% lower than it would otherwise have been. For the EU, this would mean 
about €1.2 trillion in lost output for 2020.2  
There are two effects on government balances. 
First, a hit to GDP reduces tax revenues. A revenue shortfall of 8.3% amounts 
to €560 billion in lower revenues for EU-27 governments in 2020 (roughly 4% of 
2019 EU-27 GDP).3  
Second, governments are scrambling to enact support packages for firms and 
workers, in the form of liquidity loans, grants to the self-employed and subsi-
dised short-work schemes to encourage firms to keep workers on the payroll, 
and one-time cash grants to the hardest hit in society. Later on, when confine-
ment measures are gradually lifted, they will have to put in place sizable stim-
ulus packages. Some of these policies will limit the revenue shortfall, as they 
stabilise incomes and consumption which are then taxed. Others are liquidity 
provisions which will be repaid. But by and large, these measures add to public 
deficits, which governments will have to fund on markets.
2 This assumes the same growth rate of EU-27 GDP, absent the Corona crisis, for 2020 as 
2018 and 2019 (roughly 3.2% nominally). 
3 We use the long-run elasticity of one based on Köster and Priesmeier, ‘Revenue elasticities 
in euro area countries: an analysis of long-run and short-run dynamics’, ECB Working paper 
No. 1989, 2017. Total government revenues of the EU-27 stood at €6.3 trillion in 2018, after 
growing roughly 4% in nominal terms in the previous two years. Assuming a similar growth 
rate for 2019 and 2020, total general government revenues in the EU-27, absent the Corona 
crisis, should have been around €6.7 trillion in 2020.  
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Graph 1. Direct fiscal expenditures in response to Covid19 (in % of GDP)
Source: Redeker and Hainbach, ‘Flattening the recession curve: Early fiscal responses to the 
corona crisis in the EU’, forthcoming, Jacques Delors Centre, Berlin.  
All member states of the EU are having to impose shutdowns. But the impact of 
COVID-19 will be asymmetric, for three reasons.
First, the health impact may be different across countries, for various reasons. Italy 
was unfortunate that it was hit first among European countries, without being 
able to draw on lessons other than those from China. Differences in social inter-
action across the EU may also have contributed, as well as different healthcare 
structures and funding. 
Second, the economic structure of EU countries differs. Some member states such 
as Germany are heavily reliant on manufacturing, others on services, especially 
tourism. Manufacturing not only stands a good chance of making a full and rel-
atively swift recovery; there is also a good chance for some pent-up demand, as 
some purchases will be postponed. Services, on the other hand, stand to suffer 
for a longer period: customers may continue to fear infection, and are less likely 
to make up for foregone purchases: customers are unlikely to go to the restaurant 
twice because they missed out on a visit during the lockdown. More services- and 
tourism-oriented economies will therefore be hit harder.
Third, countries start from different positions. Italy was already struggling eco-
nomically, and labouring under a debt burden of over 130% of GDP. In Spain, un-
employment still stood at 14% as a result of its long-lasting economic crisis. Not 
all countries are therefore in a position to shake off a public health crisis without 
considerable long-term economic damage.
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2 Three scenarios for Europe’s economic response
For these reasons, Italy and Spain are likely to suffer most, both economically and 
in terms of health outcomes. This leads to the following three scenarios for the 
economic response to the crisis in Europe.
2.1 Scenario 1: Timidity and divergence
Countries in the EU enact support and stimulus packages according to their respec-
tive economic and fiscal strength. Countries with high debt burdens and struggling 
economies, such as Italy or Spain, implement the most urgent support measures 
only; while economically and fiscally strong countries support their firms and work-
ers generously, and stimulate a swift recovery after the lockdown ends. 
As a result, economic fortunes in Europe diverge drastically, as some member 
states limit the economic fallout and generate a proper recovery, while others see 
a sizable part of their private sector go into bankruptcy, leading to mass unem-
ployment and long-term economic scars. The effect on public debt in the most vul-
nerable countries is uncertain: a timid response to the unfolding economic crisis 
could well make public debt (relative to GDP) increase faster than a bolder policy 
response and stimulus. In any case, this is a nightmarish scenario for Europe. Di-
vergences of economic fortunes within the Single Market were already substantial 
before the crisis. In this scenario, they would become politically untenable and 
would give rise to economic nationalism in countries like Italy, probably leading to 
calls for an exit from both the Single Market and the euro. Worsening economic 
prospects in some countries would also have negative spill-over effects on other 
member states, as bankruptcies would raise the cost of imports, and there would 
be lower demand for exports.
2.2 Scenario 2: Overburdening vulnerable member states
The ECB’s PEPP and access to the ESM convince all countries that their response 
to the on-going crisis should be as bold as is necessary to minimise the economic 
fallout. For the reasons noted above, that bolder response may lower public debt 
relative to scenario 1. But countries will end up with a much higher debt burden. As 
the ECB withdraws PEPP support, markets may reassess whether Italian or Span-
ish debt is sustainable.
The ECB’s PEPP programme was the right thing to do and can be defended on legal 
grounds4, but the ECB is still barred from financing governments directly. Monet-
ising public debt is therefore the absolute last resort, and may be impossible polit-
ically. Rapid reductions in debt ratios through post-crisis growth is unrealistic for 
countries with low growth potential. In this scenario, some member states may 
be constantly in danger of losing access to financial markets, which would inev-
itably undermine their growth prospects further. Resolution may come through 
a restructuring of one or several member states’ public debt, or countries might 
need constant support by the ECB. This scenario is also unviable for Europe. 
4 Grund, ‘Legal, compliant and suitable: The ECB‘s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme’, 
Jacques Delors Centre Policy Brief, 2020. 
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2.3  Scenario 3: Burden sharing
Scenarios 1 and 2 are likely to break the political fabric of the EU. The only viable 
scenario involves sharing the burden of the COVID-19 crisis among all EU mem-
ber states. In the current situation, countries need to be able to spend what is 
needed without ending up on the cusp of an unsustainable debt burden. Europe 
needs political agreement on the principle that a large part of the costs of the 
pandemic has to be shared in a way that all countries can take the necessary 
measures without being financially overwhelmed. Then member states can 
agree on an economically and legally sound instrument that is capable of deliv-
ering this kind of burden sharing.
In the following, we outline what such an instrument could look like.
3 The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument
We propose a one-off common EU crisis response that is tailored to this specific 
crisis. Burden sharing in this crisis should not permanently alter the financial 
architecture of the EU or of the Eurozone. Nor do we need to create new in-
stitutions. The aim is to ensure that the old institutional setup has a reasona-
ble chance of surviving this crisis. It also aims to give all countries the certainty 
they need to spend as the crisis requires. Otherwise, we may end up in scenario 
2, with highly indebted countries doing too little, causing long-term economic 
damage. To provide this certainty, burden sharing has to be agreed now, not in 
a few months.
Through our Pandemic Solidarity Instrument, the EU would raise the necessary 
funds in markets on its own account. It would spend those funds in four ways: 
to cover costs directly related to fighting the virus; to strengthen the EIB; to sub-
sidise short-time work schemes; and to co-finance national stimulus packages 
once economies are opening up again. The Instrument would be set up under Ar-
ticle 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The box below 
explains in detail the legal implications.
This is how the Instrument would work in practice.
3.1  Expenditure
•	 All countries should have the necessary means to finance the health-related 
costs of this crisis. €20 billion of the funds raised by the Instrument should be 
made available to member states to cover COVID-related healthcare costs, such 
as the purchase of additional ventilators, protective gear and the set-up of new 
intensive-care units. The Instrument would cover 80% of eligible expenditures 
while member states cover the remaining 20%.
•	 Companies should receive the necessary liquidity throughout the Union to survi-
ve the lockdown. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has proposed an EU-wide 
scheme to this end and has asked members for €25 billion in guarantees to fund 
liquidity support of about €200 billion. This is a good start, but too small to have 
a sizable effect throughout Europe. Initially, Germany’s liquidity programme via 
“We propose a  
one-off common  
EU crisis response 
that is tailored to 
this specific crisis.”
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its public investment bank KfW had a volume of about €465 billion, but it is 
now unlimited. Since Germany makes up 25% of EU-27 GDP, an EU-wide scheme 
should aim for liquidity support of at least €1.8 trillion. The EIB should provide 
half of this support, with the other half provided by national governments and 
public investment banks. To this end, the EIB should receive about €120 billion of 
the Instrument’s funds in the form of direct guarantees from the EU.
•	 The EU should support efforts that help Europeans keep their jobs during the 
containment phase, such as the French ‘chômage partiel’ or Germany’s ‘Kurz-
arbeit’ (short-work) scheme. Such schemes already exist in many member sta-
tes and could be introduced in more.5 For every worker that is furloughed under 
such a scheme, the EU should contribute up to 40% of the net salary as long 
as member states match this. In addition, all member states should receive a 
subsidy of short-term unemployment benefits of up to 25% of the net salary as 
long as the subsidy is matched by the member state for the first six months of 
unemployment. Pay-outs here would depend on labour market developments in 
member states. It is impossible to estimate ex ante the cost of this scheme, gi-
ven the uncertainty about the size and duration of the impact of COVID-19. The 
German ‘Kurzarbeit’ cost about €4.6 billion in 2009, with 1.1 million beneficiari-
es.6 A ballpark estimate is that uptake in the German Kurzarbeit scheme in this 
crisis could well end up 3 times higher than in 2009. In 2009, Germany also paid 
out €17 billion euros in unemployment benefits in a situation where job losses 
were comparatively limited. Taken together, these figures lead us to estimate a 
minimum EU-wide need of about €30 billion for short-term work schemes and 
about €70 billion for short-term unemployment benefits, thus bringing funding 
needs to €100 billion.
•	 All countries will need to deploy substantial fiscal stimulus once containment 
measures can be gradually lifted.7 Some countries will need more than others. 
The more an economy relies on sectors in which pent-up demand is unlikely (in 
particular services such as tourism), the more the state will have to stimulate 
spending. The EU should support such measures: our Instrument should fund 
50-75% of eligible fiscal stimulus measures. Measures should be eligible if they 
have a clear stimulating effect; are not undermining EU goals such as the fight 
against climate change; and have tangible spill-overs to the rest of the Union. 
The overall envelope per country should be calculated based on the GDP short-
fall in the first half of this year. The more dependent the economy is on sectors 
that are unlikely to see catch-up effects, the larger co-financing should be. If we 
assume that the necessary stimulus will be 2% of EU GDP and an average co-fi-
nancing of 65%, this brings us to an envelope of about €200 billion. 
Altogether, this means that the EU would need additional funds of about €440 
billion to be spent over the coming 12 months.
5 For an overview see Schulten and Müller, ‘Kurzarbeitergeld in der Corona-Krise’, WSI Policy 
Paper, 2020.
6 This covers both replacement of 60% of the salary and the payment of social security 
contributions by the state. 
7 Odendahl and Springford, ‘The two economic stages of coronavirus’, Centre for European 
Reform, 2020. 
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3.2  Funding
The EU should borrow the funds in the market. It would issue a one-off Pandemic 
Solidarity Bond backed by the EU budget with long maturities of 20-50 years. To 
raise €440 billion, the EU would need to receive irrevocable and unconditional 
guarantees from member states.8
These guarantees could, in principle, follow the model of the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), which was set up as a temporary lending facility during 
the euro crisis. The guarantee structure of the EFSF proved financially solid and 
has the advantage that it has already been tested during adverse market con-
ditions.9 However, the EU would remain the bond issuer and would be liable 
to repay it. It could draw on the guarantees if need be, but it could potentially 
make good on its liability by other means. This is important. The EU is an insti-
tution with its own capacity to act, and therefore, the guarantees would not 
count as member states’ individual debt by Eurostat.10 This is a major advantage 
compared to all variants that rely on extra-institutional setups such as special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs), as guarantees to SPVs are counted as national debt. The 
legal act setting up the asset and establishing the guarantees would need to be 
ratified by some national parliaments, such as the German Bundestag. 
The bonds could be perpetually refinanced in the market when they come due, 
leaving the guarantees in place. But the legal act should contain a provision that 
regulates how the bonds are repaid, should member states decide to do so when 
the bonds come due. We propose a simple solution here: member states should 
be liable for repayment not according to their share of the guarantees, but ac-
cording to their share in EU GDP at the time of repayment. A 30-year bond would 
thus be repaid by member states according to their economic strength in 2050. 
So the Instrument would have a guarantee structure to give the EU the solid 
legal basis for cases of default -- and a repayment structure that ensures that 
the strong end up supporting the weak, whichever countries those will be in the 
distant future.
The Pandemic Solidarity Bonds would not only finance the measures above. They 
would also substantially enlarge the volume of supranational safe assets that 
the ECB could buy in its purchase programmes and that banks could pledge as 
collateral. At the same time, markets would be able to absorb such a large sum 
of new, safe assets and fund the Instrument at similar rates to those of the ESM.
 
8 The EU can issue debt without guarantees but is limited to the margin between the ex-
penditure ceilings in the Multiannual Financial Framework and the revenue ceiling in the 
Own-Resources Decision. This margin is about 0.2% of GDP per year and thus too small. In-
creasing that margin is possible, but politically more challenging in our view, which is why 
we prefer one-time guarantees. 
9 See ESM, ’Top credit rating for EFSF’s debut debt issuance’, Press Release 19 January 2011
10 Eurostat counts EFSF debt to the Maastricht debt of member states based on the guaran-
tees given to the facility, because it is not an “institutional unit” but an “an accounting and 
treasury tool”. It does not do so for the ESM as it is considered an “institutional unit” even 
though the callable capital of the ESM has very similar characteristics to the EFSF guaran-
tees. As the EU is definitely an “institutional unit” in the Eurostat sense, debt incurred under 
our proposal would not be counted as public debt of member states by Eurostat.
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Graph 2. ESM yield curve (in %)
Source: ESM 
Box 1: The legal underpinning of our proposal 
Article 122 TFEU provides the EU with a legal basis to enact extraordinary mea-
sures under “exceptional occurrences”. Article 122 TFEU has two prongs: while 
Article 122(1) allows the EU to take measures appropriate to the economic situ-
ation “in the spirit of solidarity”, Article 122(2) provides a legal basis for ad hoc 
financial assistance to one or more member states. There is no doubt that the 
current COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing economic crisis constitutes the 
type of exceptional occurrence that Article 122 TFEU sought to address. One 
may even go as far as arguing that there has never been a more urgent need to 
make real the overarching principle of solidarity enshrined in the EU Treaties.
Since Article 122 TFEU provides an exception from other primary law provisions, 
such as the no-bailout clause, it is not limitless: it must be narrowly framed and 
follow the subsidiarity principle.11 Given that the COVID-19 pandemic affects the 
Union as a whole and causes severe economic disturbances in all member sta-
tes, there should be little doubt that collective action is necessary. With respect 
to the type of measures that may be taken on the basis of Article 122 TFEU, the 
Council has a wide margin of discretion. The main requirement is that the mea-
sures need to be “appropriate to the economic situation.”12 Given the unprece-
dented disruptions that the pandemic has already caused, even highly extraor-
dinary common economic measures are likely to be deemed appropriate.
With respect to the law-making process, the Council decides with qualified ma-
jority on Article 122 TFEU measures following a proposal by the Commission, 
which can take the form of either a directive or a regulation.13 The European 
 
11 In other words, the objectives of the measures taken must be of such nature that they 
could not be achieved at the national level. Smulders and  Keppenne in: von der Groeben et 
al, Europäisches Unionsrecht, AEUV Art. 122 (ex-Artikel 100 EGV), para 7. 
12 ibid. 
13 Kempen in: Streinz, EUV/AEUV, AEUV Art. 122, para 5. 
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Parliament has no formal role in the legislative process stipulated by Article 122 
TFEU. However, national parliaments will have to play a strong role according to 
national constitutional requirements if the legal act under Article 122 involves 
guarantees provided by member states, as we propose here. This means that al-
though theoretically legal acts under this article can be adopted by a qualified 
majority in the Council, some parliaments, such as the German Bundestag, will 
have to ratify the act to comply with domestic constitutional law.
In the case of our proposal, Article 122 TFEU provides an exception with re-
gard to two relevant primary law provisions: The no-bailout clause (Article 125 
TFEU) and the prohibition for the EU budget to go into deficit (Articles 310 and 
311 TFEU).
Article 125 TFEU – no bailout clause
Article 122 TFEU can be understood as an exception to the no-bailout clause.14 
More specifically, Article 122 TFEU epitomizes the principle of solidarity among 
member states in cases where the economic situation in one or more member 
states warrant exceptional measures by the EU. The solidarity clause would 
thus counterbalance the strict no-bailout clause with a view at allowing col-
lective action in certain exceptional circumstances.15 In this re, we must also 
differentiate between Article 122(1) and Article 122(2). While Article 122(1) fo-
cuses on measures taken in the spirit of solidarity, Article 122(2) talks specifi-
cally about “financial assistance.”16 For the purpose of a Pandemic Solidarity 
Instrument, the former provision seems more suitable, since the measures we 
propose go beyond “financial assistance” in the strict sense of the word, i.e. 
beyond the mere granting of loans. Relying on Article 122(1) TFEU also seems 
more appropriate in light of the new instrument’s objective, not least since 
(only) Article 122(1) explicitly refers to measures taken “in the spirit of solida-
rity.” Finally, Article 122(1) TFEU also provides more flexibility against the back-
drop of the European Court of Justice’s Pringle judgement.17 Pringle raises some 
questions as to the precise meaning of “financial assistance” under EU law 
and leaves some uncertainty whether Article 122(2) requires conditionality.18 
This is not to say that Article 122(2) TFEU is unsuitable, but rather that Article 
122(1) TFEU provides a superior legal basis for the instrument we propose.
Article 310 and 311 TFEU
The other relevant provision is Article 310 TFEU which stipulates that all re-
venue and expenditure of the Union have to be shown in the EU budget and 
that the EU budget has to be balanced. As our proposal entails grants, i.e. di-
rect expenditure, one could argue that these have to be financed by actual 
contributions and cannot be financed by bonds issued by the EU. However, 
this argument is not convincing. As explained above, Article 122 TFEU gives the 
Union wide discretion to act “in the spirit of solidarity” and Article 311 TFEU 
14 See for this reading of the provision in Smulders and Keppenne in: von der Groeben et al, 
Europäisches Unionsrecht, AEUV Art. 122 (ex-Artikel 100 EGV), para 11. 
15 Ibid. 
16 To recall, Article 122(2) provided the legal basis for the European Financial Stability Mech-
anism (EFSM).  
17 C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland and Others, 27 November 2012. 
18 See for a recent discussion of the meaning of “financial assistance” in van der Sluis, 
“A Euro area budget: another seedling?”, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper Series, 
2019/04. 
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stipulates that “the Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to 
attain its objectives and carry through its policies.” In the current situation, 
it would be very hard to argue that any meaningful act of solidarity can be 
taken by the Union without fresh money and it would be equally hard to say 
that this fresh money can come from member states’ direct contributions at 
a time when all member states have to turn to markets to finance their own 
expenditures. In this context, raising funds from bond sales by the Union that 
are backed by member states’ guarantees to finance emergency expenditure 
should qualify as “means necessary” for the Union to be able to reach the soli-
darity objectives pursuant to Article 122 TFEU. All revenues from the bond sales 
would then count as normal revenues of the EU budget and potential interest 
payments on bonds issued to finance the new instrument would count as nor-
mal expenditures. To be sure, just like measures based on Article 122(1) TFEU, 
any financing by EU member states outside the ordinary budgetary process 
must be limited in time and in scope to fighting the extraordinary threat that 
the COVID-19 outbreak poses to the Union and its members.
3.3  Necessary measures beyond the Pandemic Solidarity Instrument
Our proposal would not fully mutualise the costs of this crisis. Doing so may 
seem justified, but would not be politically feasible. All member states will thus 
have to finance a portion of their additional fiscal expenditure on markets. They 
will face different funding costs when doing so.
With the PEPP, the ECB has intervened forcefully in government bond markets 
and will continue to do so until the European economy has recovered. But the 
ECB should not be the only backstop for member states’ access to markets. There 
are political and legal limits to ECB bond purchases. On 5 May 2020, the German 
Constitutional Court will deliver its judgment on the ECB’s QE programme and 
this could lead to doubts about the legality of PEPP if the Court puts severe limits 
on the Bundesbank’s participation in QE. What is more, the ECB will face ques-
tions about whether mass purchases of government bonds are still legitimate 
when they mostly serve the purpose of keeping member states afloat. The ECB 
has no legal or political mandate to fully mutualise or even monetise European 
public debt. 
This is why additional lines of defence for member states’ financing are neces-
sary. Given the severity of the crisis, such transfers are justified, above and be-
yond the risk sharing in the Instrument outlined above. The Commission’s SURE 
proposal is a good start – a credit line of up to €100 billion to support countries’ 
fight against unemployment. A special COVID credit line19 in the ESM would fur-
ther help countries finance their increased debt burdens. A credit line of €100 
billion credit would reduce Spain’s interest costs by €100 billion over a 10 year 
period, for example.20 Both the SURE proposal and a special ESM line would en-
tail some transfers, as lending rates and funding conditions in both are subsi-
dised by the fiscally strong countries in the EU. But given the severity of the crisis, 
such transfers are justified, above and beyond the risk sharing in the Instrument 
outlined above. 
19 Bénassy-Quéré et al, ‘A proposal for a Covid Credit Line’, VoxEu.org, 2020. 
20 Erce et al, ‘The ESM must help against the pandemic: The case of Spain’, VoxEU.org, 2020. 
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Conclusion
The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument would provide more vulnerable member 
states with enough fiscal relief to act as forcefully as economically strong coun-
tries. Action cannot be left to a “second phase” of crisis fighting further down the 
line – member states need that certainty today that they will have the necessary 
fiscal space in a few months’ time. The proposal does not create a ‘transfer union’ 
feared by some in Germany, the Netherlands and elsewhere, nor open-ended 
debt mutualisation. It is sizeable but proportionate, since COVID-19 could result 
in an existential crisis for the European project. 
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